Fuzzy little things that I find interesting.

Political musings from someone who thinks the S-D curve is more important to politics than politicians.

Month: November, 2021

Foundation, the TV series. A rant.

So for something very different, but something which ties back into the things I’m personally interested in.

A rant about Foundation, the TV series on Apple TV.

This contain spoilers, so beware.


First, the good part. Visually spectacular. The acting by Lee Pace (“Empire”) was fantastic. It’s a fun show and worth watching for the visuals.

But this was not Isaac Asimov’s Foundation series. It’s like we took many of the names in the book, some of the notions described in the book, and created a new story that utterly missed the point. Then we threw in a story about the Empire itself which, again, utterly missed the point.


I knew that the authors who created the TV series missed the point on the first scene when we see Empire wearing a personal force shield.

That’s because in the books, scientific curiosity had been stifled, as we see repeatedly by aristocrats talking about performing a scientific investigation by searching the vast books already written on a topic and trying to draw your own conclusions. The very idea one would travel to a location to see for yourself, or otherwise perform actual experimentation or try to create something new, was unthought of:

Hardin continued: “It isn’t just you. It’s the whole Galaxy. Pirenne heard Lord Dorwin’s idea of scientific research. Lord Dorwin thought the way to be a good archaeologist was to read all the books on the subject—written by men who were dead for centuries. He thought that the way to solve archaeological puzzles was to weigh the opposing authorities. And Pirenne listened and made no objections. Don’t you see that there’s something wrong with that?”

And the Empire built big. It never built small.

It’s out of fashion in these decaying times to be a scholar. Events race and flash past and who cannot fight the tide with nuclearblast in hand is swept away, as I was. But I was a scholar, and I know that in all the history of nucleics, no portable force-shield was ever invented. We have force-shields—huge, lumbering powerhouses that will protect a city, or even a ship, but not one, single man.

One of the themes in Asimov’s books is that the Empire represents the big, lumbering, the old, the disinterest in science. The empire thought in terms of spreading across galaxies and using all the resources available to power large ships–but those ships had become so reliable, that engineers became a hereditary caste.

And the Foundation, out of necessity based on its location and the forces of history, had to think small. They had to create new things, had to do research, had to, out of necessity, produce a nuclear power plant the size of a walnut capable of powering a personal force shield.

So when in the TV series “Empire” walks out wearing a personal force shield, it told me the producers of the TV series utterly missed the point.


In the books, the Empire was decaying for several reasons, all enumerated early on in the books:

The fall of Empire, gentlemen, is a massive thing, however, and not easily fought. It is dictated by a rising bureaucracy, a receding initiative, a freezing of caste, a damming of curiosity—a hundred other factors.

We also learn that the fall of Trantor–the imperial capital at the center of the galaxy–will be driven by the various internecine wars motivated by various aristocratic powers seeking (and, sometimes successfully) capturing the throne:

As Trantor becomes more specialized, it becomes more vulnerable, less able to defend itself. Further, as it becomes more and more the administrative center of Empire, it becomes a greater prize. As the Imperial succession becomes more and more uncertain, and the feuds among the great families more rampant, social responsibility disappears.

And while many of the changes made by the TV series was justified by the producer as the idea that Psychohistory cannot translate to the big screen because the point of Psychohistory is that individuals cannot change the flow of history, while TV and movies deal with the idea of a single savior saving the universe as its stock in trade–sure, fine. I understand that.

But this was never a justification to toss out all the rest.

Look: the fall of the Empire in Asimov’s books is the fall of the Roman Empire. And the fall of the Roman Empire was a period of much action–and much chaos–as different ruling families struggled to take and control the imperial throne. That in and of itself could have created a fantastic story of action as families struggle, as court intrigue takes place in the background, as emperors are overthrown by other aristocrats who could have been portrayed as good guys but turn out to be bad guys themselves.

And we could have done all this with a backdrop of disinterest in innovation. Perhaps even have an Empire story line involving an aristocrat seeking to take control coming up with innovative ways to win the war–but who then gets killed by his subordinates who are afraid that aristocrat’s intelligence may make him too powerful.

It inherently means that the Empire side of the TV series must necessarily be an anthology of sorts: no actor on the stage gets to stick around for more than a few episodes at best before either time or–more likely in the case of the Imperial storyline–war–shuffles them off the stage.

And all this could have been backdrop to a Foundation facing its first “Seldon Crisis” of a Foundation between four warring self-proclaimed kingdoms desperately seeking for help from an Empire who was crumbling into a slow-motion civil war.

Hell, you can even create commentary about today’s world by having refugees flood in from the parts of the Empire that have devolved into civil war–and even a whole story line about how the refugees are turned away at the border.


That is, you could have crafted, into this wide spanning story of Imperial civil war and disinterest in innovation, of monstrous star ships waging war and refugees fleeing the border as local kingdoms fall into barbarism, the idea that a single individual can thoughtfully navigate the situation and save the Foundation.

Hell, you could have even crafted statesmen who speak truths about accepting others–as in the case of a refugee crisis–while other individuals engage in action to run blockades or blast enemies out of the sky.

Keep Hollywood’s need to craft universe-saving heroes and swashbucklers with the idea that the reason why the Sheldon Plan works is not because of sweeping forces of humanity moving inexorably towards a fixed destiny, but because there are always this string of the enlightened who are, because of their skill and cunning and philosophical insights, in the right place at the right time to save the day. (An idea you can then explore in later series by revealing the nature of the Second Foundation.)

There was never a need, even in Asimov’s world of Psychohistory, of the Empire’s inexorably fall to failure, of massive movements of history, to do away with the Hero’s journey or with the idea that one lone man can stand up and fight the forces of darkness and win.


But that is not what we got.

What we got instead was Hari Seldon turned into an immortal AI, “Empire” as a perpetually cloned copy of himself, and Gaal Dornick and Salvor Hardin skipping forward through time with their own story. What should have, in essence, been an anthology series instead turned into a family drama as two immortal beings (one an AI, one a perpetual clone) do a battle of whits.

Yes, the individual saving the world is the coin of the realm of Hollywood. But it doesn’t mean missing the entire God-damned point of the series.


It’s this failure to understand the underlying philosophical ideas–and writing to those philosophical ideas in a way which expresses the sadness of systemic failure and the hope of individuals fighting against this decay for a better future–which is not just the failure of Apple TV’s “Foundation” series. It’s endemic to the rest of Hollywood itself.

We saw this in the Star Trek Franchise, as pointed out in the essay The Politics of Star Trek in the Claremont Review of Books, and that failure to understand the underlying philosophical ideas shows up in spades in J.J. Abrams’ movie adaptation:

This creates a paradox when the crew encounters Khan in Into Darkness. Dispatched to arrest the perpetrator of a terrorist attack, Kirk learns it is Khan—“genetically engineered to be superior so as to lead others to peace in a world at war,” Khan explains—and that earth’s current military leadership were secretly employing him as a military strategist. “I am better,” Khan says, at “everything.” But this is how Kirk, too, is depicted—as destined to command just because he is “better.” “[I]f Khan and Kirk have the same motivation,” asked critic Abigail Nussbaum, “why is one of them the bad guy and the other the hero?”

Of course the question is never answered except by appealing to an older Spock, whose justification is… wanting. But then:

In 2009, Abrams admitted to an interviewer that he “didn’t get” Star Trek. “There was a captain, there was this first officer, they were talking a lot about adventures and not having them as much as I would’ve liked. Maybe I wasn’t smart enough.”

No, you weren’t.

Which is okay: as a space adventure the new Star Trek movies are fantastic.

As thoughtful science fiction, your movies sucked.


I once read an essay that I can’t seem to find now.

In it, the author defended “Star Trek: The Motion Picture”‘s slow pacing by observing that there are two forms of science fiction: “slow” science fiction, and “action” science fiction. And the problem is not the stuff with the slow pacing; the problem is the stuff in the middle. The stuff that can’t make up its mind if it wants to expound principles or show action.

Back in the 1960’s when a lot of science fiction was essentially “pulp” fiction: fiction printed in cheap “pulp” magazines–a lot of science fiction was actually coded discussions of social issues and deeper philosophical notions. Thus, “slow” science fiction: science fiction that is as interested in expressing an idea or painting a backdrop or coloring a scene about fundamental philosophical principles as it is in telling a story of invading troops or swashbuckling heroes.

And Asimov’s Foundation series, rooted as it was in the “pulp” fiction world when it was originally published (the first four chapters of the first Foundation book were originally published as a series of short stories in the 1940’s) is deeply entrenched in the “slow” science fiction category: science fiction of ideas rather than of action.

But as the Claremont Review of Books points out for Star Trek–an idea we see with today’s modern story tellers across all genres–there is little interest in thoughtful ideas:

[J.J. Abrams’] films accordingly eschew the series’ trademark dialogues about moral and political principles, and portray the young Kirk and crew as motivated largely by a maelstrom of lusts, fears, and resentments.

The Claremont essay concludes:

Over nearly 50 years, Star Trek tracked the devolution of liberalism from the philosophy of the New Frontier into a preference for non-judgmental diversity and reactionary hostility to innovation, and finally into an almost nihilistic collection of divergent urges. At its best, Star Trek talked about big ideas, in a big way. Its decline reflects a culture-wide change in how Americans have thought about the biggest idea of all: mankind’s place in the universe.

This saddens me because there has always been room in classical liberalism–that is, in the notions originally expressed by folks like John Locke, David Hume and Adam Smith as well as others, to portray a philosophy of acceptance but exploring the limits of what is acceptable in the battles as elbows rub against each other. The values of the Federation were that of accepting all races and creeds and ways of life, and the benefits of this acceptance means a dynamic growth of ideas that lead to wealth and prosperity–but the price of entrance was being willing to accept others yourself. And failure in that acceptance leads inherently to distrust and disruption.

And these values can even be explored in the backdrop of the fall of Rome represented as a Galactic Empire, with individuals preserving the values of individuality and acceptance, as well as the other values of curiosity and investigation and Enlightenment-era rationality in a universe where reactionary hostility to innovation, scientific stagnation and cultural nihilism leading to civil strife.


But that’s not what we got with Foundation, the TV series.

In no small part because, in a real way, Hollywood itself represents the Empire–and the Empire never tells bad stories about itself, especially when it is in slow philosophical decay. The Empire can never tell bad stories about itself, because the Empire never values those cultural or philosophical ideas that would lead Imperial subjects to be able to speak Truth to Power, or to Question Authority.

These values of radical individualism that were ascendant in the 1960’s are now values which are highly distrusted by the supposed intellectual descendants of those 1960’s radicals. And this idea that we could build a better world based on rational thought and acceptance of others–they’ve been replaced by the emotional grunt and the wailing about the unfairness of the world and the need to burn it all to the ground.

And in a way, those 1960’s radicals–the ones who saw Enlightenment-era ideas of individualism as a path forward, and who proposed a better world of thoughtful acceptance, where the cost of admission was being accepting yourself–they lost.

Substituted in Hollywood by the mindless slashing of a light saber, the mindless shooting up of an imperial base from laser turrets, the mindless storming of the castle by hundreds of armed men, as people who are supposedly superior with no given justification are seen as good guys or villains only by virtue of how they dress or which strand of music plays in the background or how they are framed by the camera.


Don’t get me wrong. I love a good action movie. I really do. Which is why despite utterly missing the point I recommend Foundation the TV series for its visuals and its action. The Empire story line, again, while utterly missing the point, is intriguing.

But do not make slow science fiction if you can’t be thoughtful and if you have nothing philosophically coherent to say.

Answering a question on Reddit.

Question: Kyle Rittenhouse was just acquitted of all charges. What do you think of this verdict, the trial in general, and its implications?


Personally I didn’t really follow the trial itself, and at a certain level the supposed crimes (or lack thereof) of a single individual doesn’t matter that much to me. Meaning I trust the judicial system to sort it all out and come to a reasonable ruling at the end.

(That said, I did encounter the bit when the prosecutor was questioning the guy who was shot and survived by Rittenhouse to admit he was shot only after he had pointed his gun at Rittenhouse on a blog post somewhere, which made me roll my eyes and think the prosecution didn’t know what they was doing. In the United States, if someone points a gun at you in a threatening manner and you have reason to believe your life is in imminent danger, you have a clear case of self-defense.)

However, I was fascinated by the media portrayal and the portrayal of the case on social media.

For me, the interesting part is not with what’s happening, but how it gets spun.

For example, in my cursory surfing on Reddit, the only remarks I had heard about the Rittenhouse case on the front page was when Rittenhouse broke down crying on cross examination by the prosecution–and many of the people were portraying him as crying crocodile tears. And a lot of hay was made in the media outlets I follow (NY Times, WSJ, some LA Times) about how the defense “stupidly thought” shrinking a video “edits the video.” (The phrasing made the conclusions apparent.) But the prosecution getting his supporting witness to confess to the fact pattern that made Rittenhouse’s self-defense a supportable proposition? Completely ignored.

So to me, the interesting part was not the trial itself–and frankly knowing nothing about the case I didn’t honestly care if Rittenhouse was found innocent or guilty. I figured after the trial I’d dig into the reasoning why and see if it made sense. (It usually does.) It’s the same approach I’ve had when, for example, some cop is put on trial for shooting some person on the street–only afterwards can you learn, for example, perhaps the cop shot unnecessarily. Or the person who was shot was on drugs and lunged at the cop with a knife. (You rarely can find these things out anymore prior to a verdict, partially because prosecution offices don’t want to taint the jury pool.)

And in this case, it was very clear the bias of most media outlets was showing pretty much from the day of the Kenosha riots.


The real problem, in my opinion, is that many media outlets, in order to support lagging readership numbers thanks to the Internet encroaching upon their near monopoly on printed news, and as a result of the reporting during the Watergate scandal of the Nixon Administration, has taken a more activist stance in their reporting.

In other words, news in the United States is less driven by a desire to find out, understand, and explain what’s going on–but by a desire by reporters to ‘make their bones’ (so to speak) in the same way Woodward and Bernstein did when it was popularly believed they toppled a President.

And because of the shrinking news budgets caused by readership who gets more and more news from the Internet (and even from Social Media), most news outlets devote less and less time to ‘beat reporting’–that is, assigning a reporter to become a subject matter expert on some topic which they can report about. (So, for example, we are missing a ‘beat reporter’ on Space who has been around the space program long enough to become a sort of expert on the issues of space launches and space probes, and who can ask intelligent questions of the scientists who, for example, work for Elon Musk. It’s why you get these 20-somethings whose education includes how to write a proper sentence and how to get published–but absolutely nothing at all about the sciences or politics or how policing works asking the most asinine questions.)

Activism reporting sells. And activism reporting can make individuals famous, such as Nikole Hannah-Jones, writer for the New York Times, with her controversial “1619 Project.”

But it makes for terrible quality news reporting, because inherently once you get beyond local news (where the victims and villains tend to be very clear cut), reporters want to look for the “truth” behind the facts, and tell narratives rather than outline information.

And narratives require reporters to pick and choose what facts are “relevant” and which ones are “not relevant”–which leads to important and narrative-changing facts being dropped on the floor.

In the extreme it has led to reporters making up facts wholesale to support their narrative, as happened with a recent accusation by the BBC on a report about climate change, where rather than interview climate skeptics, simply made up what they thought the climate skeptics would have said. (It doesn’t matter if they got the remarks right or not–the point is they didn’t ask. And in not asking, in order to support a narrative, they’re no longer reporting. They’re engaging in story telling.)


I think the long-term implication of all of this is a continued decline in readership–which was already being fueled by economics and by competition. But that decline will be accelerated as people find they’re not actually reading the news–but reading stories designed to support the egos of the readership by making those readers feel good about themselves and their supposed moral superiority over those these media outlets suggest are the villains, such as Rittenhouse.

And the real problem with media outlet activism and spinning narratives over stories is that the political “left” and “right” axes are not monolithic groups who all engage in “left-wing group think” or “right-wing group think.” In fact, individuals who label themselves “liberal” or “conservative”, “left” or “right” actually have beliefs on individual topics that are all over the place.

And a common grouping–where I suspect the majority of Americans actually lie–are those who are socially liberal, but economically conservative and politically anti-authoritarian. The “I believe in gay couples armed with guns” folks.

The risk is as newspaper activists spin more and more narratives along one axis or another, they’ll find themselves trodding into areas which offend parts of their readership. It’s inevitable. The “gays with guns” folks may get offended at a narrative that suggests couples protecting themselves with deadly force are evil assholes may look at the gay couple who (historically) see themselves as potential victims without weaponry and think “wait a second.”

That will cause the readership to shrink more and more.


It’s also bad for our political system because a lot of this activism influences what our politicians think their voters believe. Meaning I think a lot of the problems we’re seeing in Washington D.C. today (and going back perhaps 20 years–so I’m not complaining about the current President, but about an entire system) comes from the fact that in many ways, the folks inside the beltway believe what the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal or the Chicago Sun-Times or the Los Angeles Times writes.

If there is anyone dumber than a 20-something journalism student asking questions about quantum mechanics or about rocket science, it’s a politician whose entire life was spent learning–and being very good at–running for office.

So D.C. winds up being completely out of touch with what’s going on in the country and with what their voters believe (having their beliefs shaped by ‘push-polls’ conducted by media outlets to support a narrative)–and you can’t solve a problem if you don’t understand the problem.

And I think this is only going to continue to get worse.

(The only saving grace of the United States is that we are a federated system of government where power is diffused across multiple jurisdictions. Meaning if one part goes bat-shit insane, the damage is limited.)


As an aside, because reporters and politicians who listen to them are increasingly out of touch with what people think and believe, and because reporters see their job as not reporting facts but–at a certain level–shaping society–I think they’re in for a world of hurt when suddenly major changes in fact patterns happen which violate the narrative.

Like the shock felt when the Democratic governor of Virginia lost the recent election–something which an honest reporter may have seen coming.

And that happens because reporters don’t shape society. They simply make polite people not speak their truths quite so loudly.


Ironically, I also think a lot of newspapers don’t understand their readership.

For example, my wife and I have an on-line subscription to the New York Times. But it’s my wife who mostly reads the on-line paper–and mostly she reads the travel stories, and me, I generally start at the recipes section.

Offend us enough and we’ll just stick to our NatGeo magazine subscription and I’ll subscribe to a cooking magazine.

The Bullshit of a Marxist view of ancient civilizations.

The real problem with archaeology, as is the real problem with our study of classical history, is that we often use today’s problems as a lens to view what was going on back then.

For example, famously the fall of Rome was attributed at various times in our history to the rise of barbarianism (or rather, illegal immigration), the rise of indecency and sexual promiscuity and a lack of morals, monetary supply problems, even environmental conditions–such as lead in the water supply–have all been proposed by various generations who seemed more interested in advocating their own reasons for why their own civilization was on the downturn. (“The lack of a righteous and moral population today,” one could imagine a statesman saying in 17th century Germany, “will lead to our downfall as surely as Rome did.”)

And so goes ancient archaeology, which has been forever caught between the two philosophers. Rousseau and his “noble savage” ideas:

The first man who, having fenced in a piece of land, said ‘This is mine’, and found people naïve enough to believe him, that man was the true founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows: Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.

And Hobbes and his Leviathan:

In such condition [one without civilization], there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

Many accounts of ancient history seem to side with Hobbes: as populations grew, the necessity to organize those populations for the purposes of survival also grew. This led to things like the Hammurabi Codex in order to promulgate a unified legal system–which presupposes a legal system and system of administration prior to the development of this code. And modern man grew side-by-side with the administrative state, Hobbes’ Leviathan, keeping the wolves of nature and the dark aspects of our own nature at bay.


Of course this account is incompatible with Marxism, whose “end of history” coincides with Hegel’s “end of history” and man’s perfect knowledge of himself. In the utopian end of Marxism is communism: a society whereby everyone acts for the good of others in that society. In this world laws fall away, as do money, as to all the restraints on human nature. And we live in perfect harmony caused by perfect knowledge of ourselves and each other, automatically doing what is good for those around us, and automatically being taken care of by those around us.

A world of perfect happiness because we all know, in our hearts, what needs to be done, and we all learn to do it with perfect love for each other.

In the words of Dr. E.O. Wilson, an entomologist who studied ants:

Wonderful theory, wrong species.

But Marxists keep on trying to push the evolution of man in an impossible direction, against our will, in ways that in the past cost hundreds of millions of lives along the way. (Because you can’t make an omelette without breaking a few eggs, right?)

And for Marxism to work, we must in our heart of hearts really believe in Rousseau and his “noble savage” theory. (Of course Rousseau never spent time with the noble savages he thought were living idealistic lives; Rousseau’s life was spent in Geneva and around Europe, in the middle of a continent with few natural features untouched by man. And when you live in the middle of a multi-thousand square mile garden, it’s hard to imagine the natural world not being a garden.)

Don’t get me wrong; Europe is incredibly beautiful. But it isn’t the Mohave desert, or pre-contact Central California, nor is it the frontiers of Alaska–all places man has pushed his reach prior to contact.


And so, into this mix of study of ancient history that is more a commentary about today’s age than it is solid archaeology and understanding the limits of what we know, we find ourselves facing a new telling that sides with Rousseau instead of Hobbes.

Early Civilizations Had It All Figured Out: a contrarian account of our prehistory argues that cities once flourished without rulers and rules–and still could. It’s a book review of the book “The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity” by David Wengrow and David Graeber.


Just from the review itself, there are a few things that make no God-damned sense to me, and I’m speaking as someone with a passing acquaintance with how my Salinan Indian ancestors lived.

Take, for example, this:

Where hunter-gatherers had hunted and gathered only enough to meet the demands of the day,…

That’s bullshit. The year has seasons, and different types of foods are available during different seasons–and some (summer and winter) can be famously less hospitable than others. The Salinan Tribe, for example, would construct these gigantic baskets to store acorns, a staple food available in central California, in order to have food available over the winter when things turned colder and food scarce. Most ancient societies invented the concept of a calendar of some kind–even if it was just verbal knowledge handed down through the generations–in order to track when it was time to gather so to survive the long winter months.

And we have evidence that our ancient ancestors stored food for leaner months going back nearly a half-million years.

Did 420,000-Year-Old Humans Plan Their Diets and Store Food?

Israeli scientists have found evidence that early humans thought ahead and stored fat and marrow laden animals bones for rainy days.

According to a new study published in Science Advances the early humans who populated the Qesem cave near Tel Aviv in Israel, between 200,000 and 420,000 years ago, anticipated their future needs through dietary planning, and the paper is making headlines because previously early humans had not been thought capable of such dietary foresight.

This implies a high degree of organizational foresight that “The Dawn of Everything”–which concentrates itself on the last 12,000 years, completely ignores, instead choosing to see hunter gatherers as:

… [T]hese early hunter-gatherers didn’t have to work particularly hard to fulfill their caloric needs, and they passed their ample leisure hours cavorting like primates.

And it has always fascinated me in any retelling of ancient history that, given all the massive disadvantages of humanity’s large brains–being born with soft heads to allow passage through the birth canal, children which take at least half a decade to reach sufficient maturity to integrate into the tribe, and 15 years to contribute to food production (compare to other animals where the infantile stage is less than 1 year), and of course our brain’s massive caloric intake–and yet somehow we never really got around to using those incredibly evolutionary disadvantageous brains of ours that started developing perhaps a million years ago, only in the last 12,000 years.

So this idea that until 12,000 years ago people basically just hung around and did nothing but sit around naked, munching on grass, telling stories and having uninhibited sex?

Yeah, I gotta call bullshit on this.

Twelve thousand years ago, give or take, the static pleasures of this long, undifferentiated epoch gave way to history proper.

As an aside, I have a feeling the reason why the history we know about started 12,000 years ago, is perhaps because the history prior to that is either underwater, as civilizations tend to gather around coastlines, and those coastlines shifted massively over the millennia. Or swept away during the last ice age 21,000 years ago. And the only signs of civilization we have pre-dating this were essentially isolated remote communities high up in what used to be distant, remote mountains in foreboding places. And which may be as representative of civilization at the time as are those folks living in the high desert in mobile homes on the outskirts of San Bernardino today represent the people of Los Angeles.

So what we know is through a very distorted lens.

An to Graeber and Wengrow’s credit, they do note the limitations of our knowledge:

In the past three decades, however, new archeological methods have disturbed many of these long-standing assumptions. The “shrines” were, Graeber and Wengrow tell us, just regular houses; the female figurines could be the discarded Barbie dolls of the Anatolian Neolithic, but they could also be a way of honoring female elders.

But supporting a community of 5,000 without any social or cultural organization?

Here I have to call hogwash. We may not know how they organized themselves. But we do know how pre-contact civilizations of the more recent past did.

It all boils down to one of the Achilles heels of Marxism and anarchism in general: Dunbar’s Number.

Dunbar’s number is a suggested cognitive limit to the number of people with whom one can maintain stable social relationships—relationships in which an individual knows who each person is and how each person relates to every other person. This number was first proposed in the 1990s by British anthropologist Robin Dunbar, who found a correlation between primate brain size and average social group size. By using the average human brain size and extrapolating from the results of primates, he proposed that humans can comfortably maintain 150 stable relationships.

We see this, for example, amongst the Salinan Indian tribes: individual settlements more or less numbered around 100 or so–familial groups who then interacted with other settlements via well-organized trade that was tracked using money beads and other accounting methods. We know they seldom intermingled with other tribes surrounding them, because of the number of stable language groups in California (around 80), often unintelligible amongst each other. (People who mingle eventually share a common language.) And even within the three major subgroups of the Salinan Indians, language drift occurred–indicating sparse contact between the major groups.)

And each ‘village’ (called ‘rancherias’ by the Spanish Missionaries) of 100 or so souls were led by an elder leader–someone selected that people mutually trusted, who could enforce peace and order within the group.

Go beyond Dunbar’s Number–and you need a way to organize those groups beyond just “everyone knowing everyone else.” Because you can’t have stable relationships with 500 souls, 5,000 souls, or 5,000,000 souls. It’s just physiologically impossible.

And our human brains treat those we don’t know as “others”–“friend or foe.” Someone who we need to be afraid of, until we get to know them.

Someone we are unable to trust.

So what was actually going on in Çatalhöyük? Graeber and Wengrow interpret the evidence to propose that the town’s inhabitants managed their affairs perfectly well without the sort of administrative structures, royal or priestly, that were supposedly part of the agricultural package. “Despite the considerable size and density of the built-up area, there is no evidence for central authority,” the authors maintain.

Lack of evidence is not evidence of lack.

And the way the 2,000 souls of the Salinan Indians–equally intelligent, similarly prone to a form of primitive agriculture which encouraged certain plant varieties to grow by pushing seeds into the dirt, equally understanding of the environment in which they found themselves–organized themselves was through isolated communities and informal central organization in the form of trade and the exchange of ideas, as well as elder leaders cooperating with each other.

Of course none of this resembles the modern royalty or priestly structures we see in Europe, nor does it entail formal administrative structures or formal written laws. Salinan Indians relied upon story telling to share ideas of community and common ontological beliefs. But the structures were there, nonetheless, sized as appropriate for the 2,000 or so souls that lived proximate to the Spanish studying them.

And in the 5,000 people living in Çatalhöyük? I suspect similar things: not just primates playing house while lazing about naked, munching grass, telling stories and having sex. But social organization would have had to exist, if only to prevent people from stealing from each other and to settle disputes. Theft and disputes which were not unknown to the Salinan people, disputes that were settled by the elder–a man often selected in part for his ability to knock heads together. (My grandfather was an elder in this spirit–and he was both levelheaded and was capable of brawling with the best.)


Now replace “social organization” with formal social organization–and I’m onboard. There’s always been more than one way to skin a cat when it comes to large groups that grow beyond Dunbar’s Number to get along than formal structures and formal laws. We even see this today with non-profit groups and how they come together.

And in fact, there seems to be a proportional relationship between organization size and the need for formal organizational structures. You don’t need Kings and elected officials and representatives and ‘representational districts’ and ‘town halls’ in a village of 100 people. On the other hand, a single elder who can knock sense into people is not going to be enough for a city of 1 million.

And this is where archaeology as us desperately looking for a reflection of how we want the world to be in our ancestors comes into play.

This is where Graeber–self-proclamed anarchist–and Wengrow–fail.

If cities didn’t lead to states, what did? Not any singular arrow of history, according to Graeber and Wengrow, but, rather, the gradual and dismal coalescence of otherwise unrelated, parallel processes. In particular, they think it involved the extension of patriarchal domination from the home to society at large. Their account of how household structures were transformed into despotic regimes requires some unconvincing hand-waving, but throughout they emphasize that any given process can be historically contingent without being simply inexplicable.

(Emphasis mine.)

The problem really boils down to regardless of how large cities grew, they did. And as large cities grew, they required a different organizational structure to maintain coherency than smaller groups required previously.

A single tribal ‘strong man’ trusted by all yields to informal structures involving a few select traders sharing stories, yields to a group of tribal ‘strong men’ who come together to coordinate action, yields to the customary structures we know of in classical history of Roman senators (who represented ‘families’–essentially the tribal villages of the Salinan People, which were comprised of interrelated familial members) coordinating society, which yielded aristocrats and manor Lords of the middle ages.

All to work around the bug of Dunbar’s Number when applied to very large groups.

Now none of this is inevitable. Remember: there are many different ways to skin a cat. But this?

Graeber and Wengrow point to moments in the distant past in which they see instances of deliberate refusal: communities that weighed the advantages and disadvantages of one ostensibly evolutionary step or another (pastoralism, royal domination) and decided that they liked their current odds just fine.

The story here is that groups knew the advantages of large cities–but deliberately refused to go along.

This is not the story we see of Salinan Indians on contact. Instead, the story we see is of a group who did not know there was another way to live. Or rather, they may have known there were other ways of living but did not have the knowledge to live that way.

Because you don’t just one day wake up and decide to build timber houses with fired-clay roofs, and engage in mass agriculture. All these things need to be learned or invented–and without them, you can become caught in a sort of cultural ‘rut’, where you know there may be better, but you simply don’t have the knowledge to actually change. And the incentives to gain that knowledge may weigh against you.

Consider it mathematically a ‘local maxima’ in the bumpy space of cultures. That is, imagine the space of culture like a mountainous landscape. You may be on top of a hill–and it could be a very nice hill. But to go to a higher peak–and enjoy the fruits of that higher peak, you first have to descend your local hill into a not so pleasant valley. The cost to descend into that valley may simply be too high–and day by day it’s far easer to survive on your local hill than figure out how to traverse to the adjacent mountain where they enjoy a higher standard of living.

And we saw that with the Salinan Indians. When the missionaries set up in the Salinas Valley–many tribes came to the monastery to learn. They weren’t seeking religious conversion–though that’s how the Spaniards interpreted it. They were seeking knowledge: how to make the clay tiles that roofed the monastery and kept water out better. How to make the softer cloths and better shoes than the woven reeds the Salinan Indians were used to. How to make the timber and adobe walls that kept the elements better at bay than reed circular houses.

And the clothing!

Hardly a single photograph of my ancestors exist that does not involve the women getting dressed up in the latest European fashions, such as this, a photograph that I believe is of two of my great grandparents.


Though Graeber and Wengrow have marshalled a vast amount of archeological evidence, they acknowledge that much of what anyone has to say about ancient societies is speculative.

That is absolutely spot-on correct.

However, remember: the lack of evidence is not evidence of lack.

Graber (noted anarchist) wants to argue that there was no organizational principle, while many archaeologists in what this essay wants to call “Big History”–because “accepted history” doesn’t sound sufficiently ominous–want to argue that the people of Teotihuacan had a central King (which presumes the attributes of absolute rule and hereditary rights). And while we can and should assume there was organization, it does not necessarily imply the formality of royalty, a King, rights of succession, or the hereditary ownership of land.


Critiques of grand narratives have been important to the modern self-image of these fields—in part as penance for having once been happy to serve the priorities of empire, peddling “civilization” as a gift to the “primitives.” One consequence, however, is that wholesale synthetic accounts of human history tend to be written in the extravagantly roughshod mode of Harari’s “Sapiens” or Jared Diamond’s “Guns, Germs, and Steel.”

And now we get to the real problem, the “tearing down of the Grand Narratives”–which, while useful, because sometimes you have to revisit a theory when you’ve clearly drawn the wrong conclusions–can go really off the rails. As it has with those schools of thought which believe there are no grand narratives, or rather, there are no conclusions you can conclude.

All knowledge in these circles are a social construct, which seems reasonable when we talk about things like religion or politics–but goes really off the rails when we talk about mathematics or science. (The German NAZIs believed in the ‘social construction’ of science–which is where they got the supposedly superior “German Science” and the supposedly inferior “Jewish Science.”)

It even can go off the rails when talking about history. While we may lack knowledge to draw firm conclusions, it does not mean history is whatever the hell we want to make of it.

Just because there is a plethora of possible ways of creating a society does not mean any mechanism for creating a society can work. Nor does it mean that the way society organizes itself is just an illusion: tell that to the judge sentencing you for trying to seal someone else’s car, as he sentences you to that illusionary prison.

It does mean we need to be open-minded to alternatives, but not so open-minded our brains fall out.


Notice further, throughout the essay, the value judgement being made against “the patriarchy” and “aristocratic organization” and the trappings of feudalism throughout the Middle Ages, as if the entire grand experiment was a mistake and perhaps, in the words of Douglas Adams, we shouldn’t have bothered coming down out of the trees.

It’s well and good to focus on those groups we paid little attention to: the tiny bands of foragers who were not central to the customary story of Kings and Great Monuments and Social Planning.

But even Graeber and Wengrow, in their rush towards tearing down the Grand Narratives of Kings and Aristocratic Rule, commit the ultimate sin of all post-modernists.

They build new Grand Narratives without realizing it.

Yet pre-agricultural people erected great testaments to their ways of life in the absence of those structural supports—at Göbekli Tepe, also in Turkey, as well as on the Ukrainian steppe and in the Mississippi Delta.

Are you sure?

After spending so much time telling us that we lack evidence to draw conclusions–that those fat female figurines may have been the ancient world’s equivalent of the Barbie doll–here we are, drawing conclusions about how people without organization built Göbekli Tepe.

How do we know Göbekli Tepe wasn’t, in fact, akin to the ancient world’s Bohemian Grove in Northern California, where those who could make the journey from those distance shores of Doggerland would come for purposes unknown to us?


But where I really get impatient–and yes, I just subjected you to a few thousand words to get to the bottom of my stack, is with shit like this: shit I agree with, but I impatiently wait, waiting for the person to take the next–to me, incredibly fucking obvious–step in all of this:

As they put it, “Humans may not have begun their history in a state of primordial innocence, but they do appear to have begun it with a self-conscious aversion to being told what to do. If this is so, we can at least refine our initial question: the real puzzle is not when chiefs, or even kings and queens, first appeared, but rather when it was no longer possible to simply laugh them out of court.”

So… the next question is not even “when” or “how”.

It’s why.

Why does a band of 100 people need an elder to ‘knock sense’ into folks?

Why do traders need money beads, accounting knots, or other means of tracking trade?

Why do larger bands wind up forming councils for formal or informal organization?

Why did ancient man eventually arrive to a point where an entire law had to literally be written in stone?

Why go through all this trouble of forming societies and civilization?


But no-one seems to be interested in “why”–or worse, dismissing the question out of hand before it can even be formulated by “power-hungry people gotta be assholes”, which is what a lot of critiques of “Big History” seem to ultimately boil down to.

Certainly the review of “The Dawn of Everything” wants to make the case that the “why” question is somehow moot: that it all was a terrible experiment gone wrong, that perhaps we shouldn’t have come out of the trees.

Peter Thiel wonders why we don’t yet live in the future of our dreams. Graeber and Wengrow think the first step forward is a reminder of the past we deserve.

That perhaps we deserve better.


And until you can ask “why”–and do so without either appeal to authority or appeal to the desire of Post-Modernists to view the world as hateful people hating, and codifying their hatred in these societally constructed “Grand Narratives” to cement their hatred–you can never then ask “how”.

Because without the “why” of a thing, you can’t figure out the “how” of a thing.

Why I don’t trust political polls.

It’s 7:30pm, you’re sitting down after dinner to watch some TV, and out of the blue your phone rings. You pick it up and on the other end you hear:

“Hi, we’re conducting a political poll in your area. We are with the firm of *blah blah blah* and we’d like to take a few moments of your time to ask you a few questions.”

Sure, you think; I’ve got nothing to do, I can answer a few political questions.

“Okay,” you respond.

“Thank you. I’m going to ask you a series of questions and I’d like to know if you strongly agree, agree, are neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.

“Question one: The government, media and financial worlds in the United States are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global sex trafficking operation.

What. The. Fuck?

Now if you’re like most people, you probably are thinking to yourself “are they serious?”

You may hang up. You may ask “are you serious?” And you may think it’s a practical joke, and answer “sure, why not”–because no-one in their right mind would ask something like that.

Would they?


“The government, media and financial worlds in the U.S. are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global sex trafficking operation.”

That, by the way, was a real question asked by the firm PRRI on a recent political poll.

The other two questions they asked in the same survey was:

“There is a storm coming soon that will sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders.”

and

“Because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country.”

This poll, by the way, was not just some marginal fringe polling agency gone off the rails.

Their results were quoted by Yahoo News: ‘Alarming finding’: 30 percent of Republicans say violence may be needed to save U.S., poll shows.

Note, by the way, 8% of Democrats agreed with this sentiment as well.


Here’s the trick of a poll like this.

The “28%” and “8%” numbers are only of people who completed the poll. In other words, in order to be counted, you had to finish all three questions, answer a bunch more questions beyond this, then wait for the demographic questions (what’s your age, what is your political party, etc), and then have your results recorded.

Not counted were the people who thought “what a bunch of fucking weirdos” and hung up the phone.

A number not reported by PRRI.

(And while PRRI claimed to have “[reduced] the effects of any non-response bias”, the methodology they include simply corrects for disproportionate demographics in the poll. In other words, if you know there are only 28% registered Republicans but you poll 40% self-described Republicans, you adjust the weight of those asked questions downwards. Importantly it does not tell us how many people thought “what a bunch of weirdos” and hung up the phone.)

And that number is important, because the percentage is based on the number of people who finished the survey and said “yes” verses the number of people who finished the survey and said “no.” There are also those who did not finish the survey who may have answered “yes” or “no”–and customarily polsters treat them as if the ratio would have been the same.

That is, people didn’t finish the poll because they ran out of time or were not inclined to finish the poll, not because the questions were off-putting.

However, if the number of people who heard “… group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles …” and who hung up the phone was fairly large, this could skew the denominator–and skew the final ratios.

Enough–and it could have skewed the numbers by a huge margin.


We can, by the way, use the number of Democrats who answered “yes” in order to give us a feel for the actual number of Republicans who legitimately answered “yes.” If we assume the margin of error of the survey was 1.5% (as claimed by PRRI), and we assume further that 2% of Democrats legitimately believe satan worshipping pedophiles control the government–then the 8% number should actually have been between 0.5% and 3.5%.

And if we shrink the Republican respondents accordingly, we get the actual number being between 1.75% and 12.25%, with 7% being the most likely answer.

That is, instead of Yahoo’s “one in three” claim, it’s more like 7%–and, as we know, that’s not an unreasonable estimate of the number of extremists in any party. (That is, I’d be surprised if the Democratic Party had more than 7% of its members believing in the Marxist revolution and believing it needs to be brought about by violent protest by groups like Antifa.)


This is why I don’t trust political polls.

Because it’s just too damned easy to produce a poll which shows those who disagree with you are a bunch of subhuman neanderthals who you need to protect yourself against–either by arresting them or by shooting them, rather than a group of people who disagree with you because of their life experience, and who you may want to engage using reason and logic.


There are other ways you can skew a poll, by the way–and quite a few of them are subtle.

First, there is the number of questions. Ask too many questions, and the only people who will answer your poll are the politically engaged and the terminally bored. (Frankly if you’re asking more than 10 questions–and that includes demographic questions at the end, you will miss out on the majority who have better things to do than talk to you.)

Second, there is the structure of the questions and the potential for bias in the polls. Even innocuous questions can establish a pattern which skew future questions.

For example:

Question: Thinking of the backlog of the number of ships waiting to unload in the Port of Los Angeles, what do you think the White House should do to help fix the problem? (Put five separate potential ideas here, including “do nothing.”)

Later on:

Question: Would you support President Joe Biden for re-election, or would you support a Republican candidate?

I guarantee you the order of those two questions will cause the “generic” Republican candidate to score higher.

Why?

Because I’ve set the stage for reminding you that there is a problem in the Port of Los Angeles, and that President Biden may not be handing it all that well. (The very nature of the question assumes the White House is currently doing nothing–which is bad.)

And any “generic” Republican–a blank slot into which you’re permitted to pour your hopes and dreams into–will then score higher as a result. (And of course fill in that blank with whomever you like the most: Ronald Reagan, John McCain, whatever.)

Even very big and relatively impartial polling companies fall victim to these biases.

Take, for example, the Gallup Poll headline Early U.S. Holiday Spending Plans Look Similar to 2020

If you look to the methodology, you find the questions were embedded in a larger survey, which is not linked on this page. The poll: “Gallup Poll Social Series: Crime” was apparently a poll on crime, not on consumer attitudes.

And notice the question numbers. Question 27: “Roughly how much money do you think you personally will spend on Christmas gifts this year?” Question 28: “Is that more, less, or about the same amount as you spent last Christmas?”

I mean, you have to be very bored to make your way all the way down to question 27 and 28 on the phone with someone. And undoubtedly more questions were asked after this–and if you don’t answer them all, your results are generally discarded.


The real problem is that it’s expensive to conduct a poll. You have to design the poll, get people together to call random numbers, code and correlate the results. And you have to publish the results–and if you’re not Gallup or Pew, chances are no-one is paying attention to you.

Unless you come up with something eye-catching.

Like “Nearly 30% of Republicans say violence may be needed to save America.”

It’s the real reason why so many polls are so incredibly biased. And they’re going to get even worse as time goes on, becoming even more sensationalist. I’m sure at some point someone will figure out how to code a question so as to get at least 20% of some group saying something akin to “I think murder is the only way to solve our country’s political problems.”

And that will make one hell of a clickbait headline on Facebook.


It’s important, by the way, to keep in mind that the vast majority of Americans, both left and right, just want to get through our day. We want to eat breakfast, get through work without something inane happening, put dinner on the table, tuck our kids in bed at night. Maybe end it with a night cap or settling under a blanket with our significant other while watching a little TV.

Most Americans, quite frankly, are banal.

And I don’t mean in the sense of “the banality of evil.” Most Americans are just trying to get through our day. Some of us are full of anxiety–and how can you blame them after the past two years we’ve had? Many will, if you fall and hurt yourself on the sidewalk, stop to help. They’ll loan you 20 bucks, and they’ll help you cross the street. And Americans–we’ll chat your ear off in the post office line if you give us half a chance.

Most Americans, in other words, are relatively nice folks.

And of those who aren’t–yes, there are the “Karens” who want to talk to your manager, the ones who clearly need to be medicated, the few who are so full of anxiety they call 911 when they see someone who they think doesn’t belong. But they’re rare.

So when you see a poll claiming 30% of Americans are about to resort to violence to get their way, stop a moment and think: does this make any damned sense?

Can you, in other words, reconcile a finding like this with your last experience standing in line at Starbucks?

And if not–or even if it does somehow make sense to you–look at the polling internals.

Does it ask stupid questions? Does it ask a lot of questions? Does it frame questions in order to make the world sound like a horrible place we’re just barely surviving in, and asks you what you think the solution is to this horrible shit show we live in?

And if so, realize you’re being manipulated.

My own politics, on reflection.

My politics in a nutshell–for those who don’t get it:

At the very very bottom of the epistemological stack I believe in individual freedom and individual agency.

We all are blessed somehow with our view of the world, a life, and a desire to live that life. And we should all have the freedom to find our own way through this universe as we see fit.

We do due justice to the individual by allowing each and every person to be as they choose to be, without undue influence from the rest of us.


From this, my basic ideas about government stem from the following demand:

Leave me alone. Let me be. Acknowledge that I have agency over my own life. And understand this applies to both the personal sphere (friendships, family, sexual unions), as well as to the economic sphere (jobs, where I live, how I spend my money).

And leave others alone, even if you don’t like the decisions they’ve made in their personal sphere (friendships, families, sexual unions), or in their economic sphere (jobs, where they live, how much money they have).

And only intervene when there is a clear issue of someone having undue influence over another by force: that is, intervene when someone is punching me in the face.


The trick of the Left is to complain that certain people–by virtue of having too much money, by working the wrong jobs, by where they live–are essentially punching you in the face by changing the landscape where you can make your economic choices.

The trick of the Right is to complain that certain people–by virtue of making the wrong personal decisions, by having the wrong sexuality, by having unusual family structures–are essentially punching you in the face by changing the landscape where you can make your personal choices.

They’re both rhetorical tricks: finding things that are aesthetically pleasing and trying to encourage the power of the State (backed by well dressed people using guns) to destroy those they find displeasing.

And while there is room for some minor limits–to discourage the formation of true monopolies in order to encourage competition and choice in the economic sphere, to discourage explicit public sexual displays to allow others to be comfortable in the personal sphere–these should be handled as lightly as possible so as to maintain the balance necessary to maximize freedom.

Balance always needs to be handled with a very light touch, not with a sledgehammer, nails and cement.

The very process of forcing balance by brute force requires–by its very nature–that certain groups of people be made “illegal” so that it’s easier to find agreement as to what is “permissible.”


A dangerous thing that you can do is allow your aesthetics to define my morality. You may not like how I live my life, how much money I have earned in my lifetime, where I live, or who I love–and that’s fair. We don’t have to like each other to get along.

But that gives you no right to destroy my life to satisfy your aesthetic sense.

Just as I have no right to destroy your life to satisfy my own aesthetic sense.

What’s even more dangerous is when we confuse aesthetics for morality–and believe our moral righteousness gives us license to destroy those who are “inferior” to our own “obvious morality.”

We see this **all. the. fucking. time** on social media, including Facebook. The constant “othering” of disfavored groups without understanding why they are–even by people who demand they themselves not be “othered.”

Righteous morality giving license to harm others–that’s a powerfully addictive drug.

Are you addicted?


Three more principles define my politics.

1. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.

If you ever read an article talking about the excesses of right-wing protests who ignore left-wing protests, or the excesses of left-wing moralizing while ignoring right-wing moralizing–they violate this principle.

Social media highlights the left-wing excesses–you have to look in the world to see the right-wing excesses: the upturned nose or the disdainful look as a “Karen” asks for the manager because two guys are holding hands or some guy with the wrong skin color enters his own house.

Both excesses exist–a clear violation of this principle.

And it’s one thing to complain about the excesses of a team whose excesses are highlighted on a certain platform.

But if you find yourself forgiving your own “team” while bitching about the other “team”–you’re violating this principle.

2. Government is a monopoly on the escalation of force.

That’s a modified version of Max Weber’s observation about the State–and it applies very well. Only an agent of the government can escalate force. Well functioning governments only escalate force for a reason–you were jaywalking, for example.

And the escalation of force ultimately will lead to your death if you don’t capitulate. Again, well-functioning governments dress this up as “resisting arrest”–but at the bottom of the stack, it was because you were jaywalking. Well functioning governments will then only escalate force in proportion to your refusal to yield to a government agent attempting to stop you from jaywalking.

One implication of this: when you say “there ought to be a law” what you’re really saying is, in a sense, “if they violate my sense of aesthetics, they ought to have their brains blown all over the sidewalk.”

Now, sometimes **we need laws.** Sometimes we need the State to intervene to prevent someone from punching me in the face.

But this is why–as I noted above–finding that balance that yields freedom requires a light touch. And why that can be deceptively hard: because in our “righteous moralizing” we tend to gloss over the fact that we’re demanding the State murder people we don’t like.

(And yes, by extension, this means I personally believe there are a number of laws that need to be removed from the books and others that need serious rethinking.)

3. The single most important purpose of governments is to create Trust between its citizens.

With all this power, and with the attempt to create that balance that maximizes freedom–maximizes your right to work as you will, to live where you will, to love whom you will and to create as you will–governments generally intervene to assure cooperation between citizens.

And the best yardstick for this is the creation and maximization of Trust, rather than capitulate to the dominant culture’s sense of aesthetics.

Through Trust guaranteed by the government you can go to the grocery store and buy a sealed carton of milk, assured that when you get home you have fresh, wholesome, safe milk, and not contaminated chalk-colored water instead.

Through Trust guaranteed by the government you can order–sight unseen–a mobile phone over the Internet and trust your credit card information wasn’t stolen and trust you’ll receive your mobile phone.

Through Trust guaranteed by the government you can deposit your entire life savings at the bank–and know you can get your money back at any time without it being stolen or lost by a large faceless corporation.

Because well-functioning governments who realize their primary purpose is guaranteeing trust prosecute those who violate our trust.


But ultimately these three points serve the underlying truism that, as much as possible, so long as I am not actively harming others (through a very narrow definition of ‘harm’ that does not succumb to the rhetorical tricks of the left or right), leave me alone.

Leave me alone so I can chart my own course through this life.